The Hon. H.J. GUMBYS (15:47): I rise to support the Criminal Procedure (Child Protection Restraining Orders) Amendment Bill 2026. This bill addresses a practical limitation in the law that can prevent a child from receiving protection even when other requirements for a restraining order are satisfied. At present, the relevant provision requires that the child resides or has resided with the adult against whom an order is sought. The Commissioner of Police has raised concerns that applications are being withdrawn or refused because that residence cannot be established.
The bill extends the provision to premises that a child frequents, allowing the Magistrates Court to consider an order in circumstances the existing wording does not adequately capture. That change recognises how an exploitative relationship can develop. An adult does not need to provide a child with a permanent home to acquire a harmful influence over them. A child may visit regularly, spend long periods at the premises, or stay intermittently while formally living elsewhere.
The National Office for Child Safety explains that grooming can involve building trust through attention or gifts, isolating a child from supportive people and using secrecy or threats to maintain control. Those behaviours help explain why repeated contact may expose a child to serious harm well before there is an identifiable living arrangement. By including premises a child frequents, the bill allows the court to respond to those circumstances where the remaining statutory requirements are met.
It also addresses an evidentiary difficulty. An adult may conceal signs that a child lives at their premises, or authorities may be unable to establish residence without the child's cooperation. A child subject to manipulation may be reluctant to provide that cooperation. The amendment reduces the extent to which access to this protective measure depends on proving residence.
The framework remains confined to children under 17 and adults who are not their guardians at premises where none of the child's guardians resides. Police, the child or the child's guardian may apply for an order. Regular attendance at an adult's home does not, by itself, justify making one. The existing statutory grounds remain, including relevant convictions or a history of child protection restraining orders involving the defendant or another person residing at, or frequenting, the premises.
Alternatively, the court may be satisfied that the child's contact or residence with the defendant exposes them to specified risks of abuse, neglect, or involvement in, or exposure to, drug offending. In every case, the court must also consider the orders appropriate in the circumstances, with the child's best interests as its primary consideration.
The bill therefore broadens the circumstances in which the court can consider protection while retaining the requirements governing whether an order should actually be made. Those requirements matter because the relationships captured by the word 'frequents' can differ considerably.
In her June 2025 submission on the earlier proposal, the Guardian for Children and Young People recognised the opportunity to address risk through regular contact rather than established residence. She also raised concerns about uncertainty in the term and the possibility of disrupting relationships that provide children with genuine support. That submission bears directly on the amendment before us. The bill deliberately leaves 'frequents' undefined so it can accommodate different patterns of attendance.
With that flexibility comes the need to examine the child's circumstances carefully, including the role the adult actually plays in their life. The existing 'best interests assessment' requires consideration of the adult's control or influence, their criminal record, any apparent pattern in their behaviour, and the views of the child and their guardian. Those considerations help the court distinguish exploitation from a relationship that offers safety and support. For Aboriginal children, understanding extended family and cultural connections is particularly important to that assessment.
The bill's second substantive change concerns what happens after a restraining order is made. It expressly requires the court to be satisfied that any temporary placement order is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. That clarification follows logically from the expanded provision. A child who frequents an adult's premises may already have a safe home to return to, so an order restricting contact with that adult may require no change to the child's accommodation. Where temporary placement is necessary, the existing framework gives priority to a guardian, followed by another person directed by the court. Placement into the minister's custody is available where the preceding options are not possible, appropriate, or in the child's best interests, and is limited to 28 days.
The separate necessity requirement ensures that temporary placement is considered on its own merits. Responsibility for complying with the restraining order remains with the adult. The protected child cannot be held liable for its breach and the bill preserves that protection. This is particularly relevant where a child may continue seeking contact because of manipulation or dependence. These orders are used infrequently, and criminal proceedings or other child protection measures will often provide an appropriate response, but where a restraining order is needed its availability should not turn on whether authorities can prove that the child lives with the adult.
The bill removes that obstacle and clarifies the circumstances in which the temporary placement may follow. Together, those changes give the court greater capacity to protect a child while requiring careful consideration of what intervention that child actually needs. I commend the bill to the council.